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Trade reform conditions are common in IMF supported programs. Of the 99 countries that had IMF
programs during 1993-2003, 77 had conditions on trade reforms in their programs. Since the WTO
has not been found especially effective in promoting trade openness for most developing countries,
it is of great interest to see if the IMF has been more effective as it combines carrots and sticks not
available to the WTO. Yet, the effectiveness of trade conditions in IMF programs has not been systematically
studied. Using a unique dataset, this paper provides such an assessment. It finds that trade conditions
are associated with an increase in trade openness on average, but the effect comes mostly from countries
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The International Monetary Fund and other international organizations have 
frequently attempted to promote structural reforms in developing countries. Both IMF 
programs and trade reform conditions embedded in the programs are commonplace. For 
example, during 1993-2003, 99 countries went through IMF programs, some with multiple 
ones. 77 of these countries had trade reform conditions in at least one program. Are these 
conditions successful in generating an increase in trade openness in developing countries? 
This paper aims to provide the first rigorous and comprehensive answer. 
 
Although most economists agree that trade openness is an important element of a 
successful development strategy, an influential paper by Rose (2004) has cast doubt on the 
common presumption that the World Trade Organization (WTO) or its predecessor, the 
General Agreement on Trade and Tariff (GATT), has promoted global trade. Subramanian 
and Wei (forthcoming) also show that the GATT/WTO does not appear to have promoted 
trade openness for developing countries, especially those that became GATT members prior 
to the Uruguay Round (though it appears to have strongly promoted trade openness among 
developed countries). This raises an intriguing question of whether the IMF, by mixing sticks 
(including trade reforms in its conditionality that go beyond a country’s commitments to the 
WTO) and carrots (providing financing through IMF supported programs if the reform 
conditions are met), can be more successful in prodding developing countries to engage in 
trade reforms. 
 
The case of trade conditions in IMF programs also provides a window to understand 
whether reform conditions embedded in international financial assistance packages work in 
general. The efficacy of conditionality in promoting reforms is highly controversial in the 
literature and in policy circles. Some argue that it is entirely futile: If a country does not want 
to engage in serious reforms on its own for domestic political reasons, then it can always find 
ways to undo the substance, if not the letter, of the conditions in these programs. Others 
argue that the conditions are very useful precisely because they might alter domestic political 
forces, overcome a political impasse, and allow the necessary reform to be enacted.  
 
The effectiveness of the trade reform conditions has not been studied in an 
econometrically rigorous way
2. While information on IMF programs and trade reform 
conditions has been made available for a few countries in recent years, it is thus far not 
generally available for many others. By taking advantage of a unique and comprehensive 
database, this paper aims to fill this void. Our approach is conceptually a difference-in-
differences methodology: We compute trade openness for each importer at a bilateral level 
before and after trade conditions were first introduced, and compare the change with either 
(a) those for other countries that had IMF programs but no trade conditions, or (b) those for 
                                                 
2 The IMF conducts periodic reviews of its trade conditions (see, for example, IMF 2001 and 
2005b). Unlike the current paper, the reviews tend to adopt a case-study approach and focus 
on a small number of countries.   - 3 -   
 
other developing countries that had no IMF programs. To control for other factors that could 
affect trade openness, we embed our estimation and testing in an augmented gravity model. 
The augmentation includes noneconomic factors such as linguistic and colonial ties, and 
regional trade agreements (proposed by Frankel and Wei, 1994), year and separate importer 
and exporter fixed effects (needed to proxy for “multilateral resistance” proposed by 
Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003), and selection for non-zero trade and intra-sector firm 
heterogeneity (argued to be important by Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein, 2005). 
 
The key findings can be summarized as follows: (a) There is evidence that trade 
conditions are effective on average. After accounting for a number of factors that could 
affect trade openness, trade conditions are associated with an increase in import volume in 
most statistical specifications. (b) However, the positive effect comes mostly from countries 
that have a high degree of “willingness to reform” by some measure. This pattern continues 
to hold after adjusting for a selection bias - the possibility that countries that wish to increase 
trade openness are more likely to agree to have trade conditions in the programs. (c) 
Implementation of trade conditions on paper does not imply real trade reforms. While a 
majority of trade conditions are recorded as having been implemented on time in the IMF’s 
database, they do not always translate into an actual increase in trade openness.  
 
Section 2 of this paper summarizes some salient facts about trade conditions in  
IMF programs. Section 3 describes a simple model to illustrate the point that external 
conditions on reforms can work but not in all instances. Section 4 lays out the statistical 
methodology, describes the data, and reports estimates for the impact of trade conditions. 
Section 5 presents a number of robustness checks and extensions. Section 6 offers 
conclusions. 
 
2.  SOME BASIC FACTS ABOUT TRADE CONDITIONS IN IMF PROGRAMS 
It may be useful to set out some basic facts about the trade reform conditions in IMF 
programs. First, as noted at the beginning of the paper, these conditions are common. Figure 
1 displays the counts of all IMF programs with and without trade conditions during 1993-
2004. The height of a bar represents the total number of IMF programs in that year (e.g., 15 
in 2003). The lower portion in black marks the number of programs that also carry conditions 
on trade reforms (e.g., 8 in 2003), whereas the upper portion in gray represents the number of 
programs without trade conditions (e.g., 7 in 2003). On average, about half of the programs 
throughout the sample have trade conditions. There is no obvious trend in the fraction of 
programs that carry trade conditions. In fact, it is at least as likely for a program country to 





Second, the number of trade conditions as a share of total program conditions has 
declined in recent years, partly because conditions related to financial sector reforms have 
increased, and many countries have more open trade regimes in the latter part of the sample. 
As presented in Figure 2, the number of trade conditions per program (among programs with 
trade conditions) exhibits an inverse-V shape over time, peaking in 1999 (at more than 5 
trade conditions per program) and then declining to 2.5 in 2003. 
 
Third, the majority of trade conditions are designed to reduce market distortions and 
to increase trade openness. These distortions can be either tariff or nontariff measures. 
Among the 77 countries that had trade conditions in their programs, 55 had conditions 
directly on tariffs. Other conditions have supported increased efficiency including through 
administrative streamlining and sometimes revenue collection. In terms of the composition of 
all trade conditions during the sample period, more than a quarter of all trade conditions are 
related to tariff reductions and rationalization. Another quarter focuses on removing nontariff 
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barriers such as exemptions, licensing requirements, quantitative restrictions, and other 
restrictions on current account transactions.
3 Over time, tariff reduction and removal of 
quantitative restrictions as a share of total trade conditions have declined, whereas customs 




Fourth, not all conditions are of equal importance in IMF programs. The strongest 
form of conditions is called “prior actions”; a failure to implement them would lead to an 
automatic interruption of the programs.
4 Approximately one-third of the trade conditions are 
in this category. Another strong form of conditions is “performance criteria”; loan 
disbursement is contingent on their fulfillment unless an explicit waiver is granted by the 
Executive Board. About 20 percent of the trade conditions are in this second category. The 
remaining trade conditions take the last and relatively weak form that is called “structural 
benchmarks.” Their nonobservance does not automatically lead to an interruption of a 
program, but may affect IMF staff’s judgment as to whether to recommend completion of a 
review. The IMF’s recent review of conditionality (IMF, 2005c) suggests that prior actions 
are often used as a screening device by the staff to gauge the authorities’ commitment to 
reform. This feature will be explored in discussing program ownership later. 
 
Fifth, another interesting pattern to note is that the implementation record for trade 
conditions is strong on paper. About 70 percent of the trade conditions are recorded as having 
been implemented on time by IMF staff in the IMF’s database on program conditions (Figure 
                                                 
3 They include measures related to preshipment inspection, concessional financing for 
exports, export-processing zones, and other country- and industry-specific issues. 
4 Some prior actions are remedial actions for performance criteria or key structural 
benchmarks in earlier IMF-supported programs that have been missed.  
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4). However, nominal implementation of specific measures may not always mean that policy 
actions have been taken with real and long-lasting effects. This paper examines the real 
impact of trade conditions. 
 
   
  To summarize, it is not unusual for developing countries to encounter trade reform 
conditions in IMF supported programs. While many such conditions involve tariff 
reductions, most deal with removing or reducing exemptions, licensing requirement or other 
nontariff barriers, and administrative reforms at customs. In other words, most trade reform 
conditions are not easily quantifiable. Reform conditions can also be classified based on the 
degree of stringency (in terms of whether non-compliance by the country would lead the IMF 
to stop disbursement of funding). The composition of these condition types reflects in part 
IMF staff’s subjective assessment of the likelihood that the country will follow through the 
reforms contained in a program. These facts provide a useful background that will guide the 
subsequent empirical work. 
 
3.  A SIMPLE MODEL 
To clarify how trade reform conditions embedded in an international financial 
assistance package may engender actual trade reforms, this section discusses a very simple 
model. It highlights the point that trade reform conditions by themselves may not always 
induce real reforms. At the same time, there are cases in which reforms take place only 
because an external assistance program is present.   
 
  To see how domestic factors and external assistance program interact with each other, 
it may be useful to summarize the domestic factors by a notion of “willingness to reform,” or 
to use a buzzword in policy circles, the national “ownership” of a reform program. Drazen 
(2003) defines “ownership” as the extent to which domestic resistance to a reform can be 
overcome with a combination of carrots (external financing) and sticks (conditionality). A 
pro-reform government wants to have conditionality in IMF programs rather than to do 
reform on its own because the former helps it to buy support from powerful interest groups in 
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the country that otherwise would veto the reform. On the other hand, the conditionality can 
only work if resistance to reform from the interest groups is below some threshold so that 
they would prefer reform with IMF financing to a combination of no reform and no IMF 
financing. 
 
Suppose a country faces balance of payment difficulties and wants to borrow from the 
IMF. The IMF agrees to make the lending only if the country implements trade reforms (in 
addition to whatever else that the IMF thinks is good for the country). The policy decision in 
the country is made jointly by the government and a powerful interest group in the following 
way. The government makes a take-it-or-leave-it proposal to the interest group. The interest 
group has a veto power, but it cannot make a counter offer. If it agrees, the reform goes 
forward; if it does not, the reform dies.  
 
The objective function of the government is the welfare of the whole economy, which 
leads it to favor the reform. The interest group’s objective function deviates from society’s 
welfare maximization. Its derived indirect utility function, V(.), can be thought of as a 
function of having the reform or not, and having the IMF program or not. In this setup, an 
IMF program with reform conditionality would succeed in inducing a reform that otherwise 
would not take place if and only if: 
 
V(reform, Fund program) >  V(no reform, no program) ≥ V(reform, no program) 
In other words, if there were no IMF program, the veto-wielding interest group would prefer 
no reform (i.e., status quo). However, the group may prefer a combination of reform and an 
IMF program to a combination of no reform and no program. 
 
  Are conditions such as these two inequalities likely to hold? We now turn to a simple, 
micro-founded model that will make it concrete how a combination of an IMF program and 
reform conditions may make a difference for the success of the reform. The model makes the 
median voter, rather than a specific interest group, to be the pivotal decision maker. Consider 
a two-sector perfectly competitive, small, open economy in which each sector produces a 
distinct good. The first sector produces an exportable good, x, whose output price is tied 
down by the world market and set to be one. The second sector produces an import-
competing good, m, that receives a government tariff protection. The tariff-inclusive price for 
good m is P. 
  
  Both sectors use labor as the only factor of production and have constant-returns-to-
scale technology. Thus, using Yj to denote output in sector j, 
 
 Y j = Lj/ aj 
And using L to denote the size of the labor force, 
 L x + Lm  = L   - 8 -   
 




m), is given by 




m. Perfect competition in 
the domestic labor market ensures that 
 w j = Pj/ aj 
where Px=1 by assumption and Pm =P. 
  Without a loss of generality, we set ax =1 and assume that the tariff on product m is 
such that the initial price on m is P







  For this small open economy, the standard trade theory tells us that free trade is 
socially optimal. Therefore, the objective of a reform program is to remove the tariff 
protection in sector m. We need a reason for why the socially beneficial reform does not take 
place. For this, we employ the insight from Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) in which 
reallocating labor between sectors is costly and individuals face ex ante uncertainty about the 
exact size of the cost. Let ck be the individual-specific cost for person k to switch from sector 
m to sector x
5. The cost is revealed when and only when the reform starts. However, the 
probability density function of the cost, f(c), is common for all individuals and known to 
them before the reform. 
 
  Suppose individuals’ certainty-equivalent preferences (indirect utility functions) are 
identical and given by 
 
  U(P, I) = V(P) I = I/P
δ  
 
where I is the individual’s certainty-equivalent income level, and 0 < δ
 < 1 is a parameter. 
  
  Since we are discussing IMF-supported programs, it is reasonable to think of the 
country as facing a temporary negative shock that is common to all individuals in the country 
and that the country is unable to borrow from the international private capital market to 
smooth consumption. For simplicity, we think of an individual’s income as her nominal wage 
income (which varies between the two sectors) minus an amount due to the negative shock, s, 
that is common to everyone in the economy. Such a negative shock occurs as the country 
loses the access to the international capital market, so that it is not able to smooth its citizens’ 
consumption on its own.  
 
                                                 
5 Following Wei (1997), this represents a simplification from the original setup in Fernandez 
and Rodrik (1991) in which individuals have to make a general investment before learning 
their sector-switching cost. Wei (1997) provides a three-sector model in which gradualist and 
big-bang styles of reform strategies are compared.   - 9 -   
 
Ex Post Scenario 
  The reform would lower P (and therefore the wage in sector m) while leaving the 
price of good x (and the wage in sector x) unchanged. This will unambiguously raise the real 
income for people in sector x. Everyone in Sector x therefore supports the reform. For people 
in sector m, there is a difference between ex post and ex ante scenarios. Ex post, once the 
reform is done, individuals would choose to stay in sector m or switch to sector x. An 
individual k will switch to sector x if her switching cost is smaller than the wage differential 
in the two sectors (which we label as c* for subsequent discussion): 
 
 c k < w’x - w’m ≡c* 
where an apostrophe denotes post-reform values. Once the reform is done, those people 
whose cost of switching to sector x is low enough may find themselves having a higher level 
of utility than before the reform and therefore may be glad that the reform has taken place. 
The rest of the people in sector m, facing high enough switching costs, will find themselves 
worse off after the reform and would seek to reverse it if they could. 
  To be precise, an individual k in sector m will not regret the reform if and only if: 




Or, with simplification, (w’x-s-ck)/P’
δ  ≥  (w
0
m–s)/P
0δ      
  ck  < (1-s) [1- ( P’/P
0)
δ] Inequality  (1) 
  If the sum of the people in sector x and the people originally in sector m but with low 
enough cost to switch to sector x exceeds half of the population, then the reform benefits a 
majority of the population by definition. The reform will not be reversed by a majority voting 
after it is implemented. If there exists a mechanism for ex post winners to compensate the ex 
post losers after the reform, then any reform that enlarges the size of the pie (after the sector-
switching cost) will not be reversed (and in fact will be supported by the population ex ante 
as well). Since it is not in the self-interest of the winners to compensate the losers ex post, 
such a compensation mechanism is not generally available, and we will rule it out for the 
purpose of the model exposition. 
 
Ex Ante Scenarios 
  How would a typical person k in sector m vote ex ante? Let us first consider the case 
without an IMF program. All individuals in sector m are identical ex ante. Person k in sector 
m will vote against the reform if her utility after the reform is expected to be lower than 
before the reform: 
 
   V(P’) {F(c*) [(wx’-s) - ∫0
c* cf(c)/F(c*) dc] + [1-F(c*)] (wm’-s)} < V(P
0) (wm
0 –s) 
   - 10 -   
 
Or, after some simplification, 
 
  F(c*) + [1- F(c*)] [1-c*/(1-s)] - ∫0
c* cf(c)dc < ( P’/P
0)
δ Inequality  #2 
  
  Since IMF programs are meant to provide insurance to countries experiencing 
temporary balance of payments difficulties, especially to those that have lost access to the 
international capital market, we make the assumption that the IMF loan program in the model 
effectively eliminates the temporary shock and restores the income back to the wage level. 
Person k in sector m may vote for the reform with an IMF program if her expected utility 
with the completion of the reform together with an IMF program is higher than without the 
reform and the IMF program: 
 
  V(P’) {F(c*) [wx’ - ∫0




  F(c*) + [1- F(c*)] [(1-c*)/(1-s)] - ∫0
c* cf(c)dc > ( P’/P
0)
δ Inequality  #3 
   
  Inequalities #2 and #3 have the same right-hand side. However, the left-hand side 
differs in the second term which is a function of s, the size of the shock. Any s>0 would 
make the left-hand side of #3 greater than the left-hand side of #2. This means that if a 
person is to vote against the reform even with an IMF program (i.e., if Inequality #3 is 
violated), then she would surely vote against the reform without an IMF program (i.e., then 
Inequality #2 holds). 
  
  We focus on the set of scenarios in which Inequality #1 holds for a sufficient number 
of people originally in sector m so that the reform genuinely benefits a majority of the 
population. There are still three cases to be considered: 
 
•  Case (a): Both inequalities #2 and #3 hold. In this case, the reform is blocked without 
an IMF program but moves forward with an IMF program. 
•  Case (b): Inequality #2 does not hold. In this case, the reform will be implemented 
even without an IMF program. IMF programs play no role in inducing reforms.  
•  Case (c): Inequality #3 is violated (which implies that Inequality #2 holds). In this 
case, everyone in sector m (and therefore the country) will reject the reform with or 
without an IMF program.   
  Are all three cases feasible equilibria? We can verify that the answer is yes: Different 
combinations of the parameters could generate each of these scenarios. As an illustration, let 
us assume that the individual sector-switching cost, ck, follows a uniform distribution over  
[0, c
u], so that f(c) = 1/ c
u and F(c*) = c*/ c
u. Let us further assume that Lm/L=0.55 (the 
original work force in the import-competing sector constitutes a majority in the country). It 
can be verified that if c
u =1, δ=0.3, P’/P=0.8, and s=0.2, we would be in Case (a): the reform 
takes place if and only if there is an IMF program. On the other hand, if c
u =0.5, δ=0.3, 
P’/P=0.4, and s=0.5, we would be in Case (b): the reform takes place even without an IMF 
program. In contrast, if c
u =5, δ=0.3, P’/P=0.5, and s=0.2, we would be in Case (c): no reform 
with or without an IMF program.   - 11 -   
 
  This discussion suggests that one cannot take for granted that IMF programs together 
with conditionality on reforms will necessarily induce reforms. Indeed, as a variation of Case 
(c), even if a government agrees to an IMF program (in order to obtain the loan to deal with 
the negative shock), it may be evasive in implementing the reform or reverse the reform once 
the IMF program is over. 
 
 
4.  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
  The empirical part of the paper does not test the model directly. Instead, it seeks to 
check if trade reform conditions are linked to changes in trade openness in countries that 
have had IMF programs with reform conditions. It also seeks to find proxies for how likely a 
country may be in Case (a) above. 
 
Statistical Specification 
The statistical framework used to assess whether trade conditions affect trade 
openness is an augmented gravity model. Such a model has enjoyed empirical success in 
terms of its ability to explain a relatively large fraction of variations in observed volumes of  




The version used in this paper incorporates a number of recent theoretical insights, 
especially those by Anderson and van Wincoop (AvW, 2003), and Helpman, Melitz, and 
Rubinstein (HMR, 2005). Both papers have importer and exporter fixed effects to proxy for 
remoteness (Wei, 1996) or multilateral resistance (AvW, 2003). HMR (2005) propose to 
correct two additional selection biases: the first caused by zero bilateral trade among some 
countries as the gains from trade are too small to overcome the necessary costs, and the second 
by “an unobserved heterogeneity bias that results from the variation in the fraction of firms that 
export from a source to a destination country.” The first bias is corrected by a standard 
Heckman approach (and implemented by estimating an appropriate Mills ratio). For the second 
bias, HMR (2005) propose a latent variable to control for the firm heterogeneity, which this 
paper calls “HMR variable” for short. The Mills ratio and the HMR variable are added to the 
analysis in this paper. 
 
The benchmark model is specified in the following form: 
 
Yi,j,t = α1IMPi + α2EXPj + α3Yeart + Xi,j,tβ + γTCi,t + εi,j,t  (1) 
 
The dependent variable  ,, ij t Y  is log of country i’s imports from country j in year t. 
                                                 
6 Frankel and Wei (1993), Frankel, Stein, and Wei (1997), Rose (2004), and Subramanian 
and Wei (2003), among others.   - 12 -   
 
, ij IMP , , ij EXP , and  t YEAR  are the importer, exporter, and year fixed effects, respectively. 
,, ijt X  is a list of variables that previous studies have found significant in explaining the 
volume of trade, including log GDP, log per capita GDP, great circle distance between i and 
j, dummies for common language and colonial links, shared borders, common currency, 
common free trade area or common market, the Mills ratio, the HMR firm heterogeneity 
variable, a dummy for imports by one WTO member from another member, and a dummy 
for imports by one WTO member from a nonmember. 
 
, it TC  is a dummy variable that measures the “treatment” effect of trade conditions. It 
takes the value of one for country i in year t if the country has trade conditions in that year or 
any year before t during 1993–2003. For example, as 1997 was the first year that trade 
conditions were applied to Guinea during the sample period, the TC dummy for that country 
takes the value of zero during 1993–1996 and one during 1997–2003. 
 
While separate importer and exporter fixed effects are included in this specification, 
they are not time-varying. Otherwise, we would not be able to identify the effect of the trade 
conditions (which is part of the time-varying importer fixed effects).This is a shortcoming of 
the specification.
7 Even with only these fixed effects, identifying the effect of trade 
conditions presents a challenge in some cases. For example, if a country had trade conditions 
attached to their programs in 1993 or 1994, the TC dummy for this country would take the 
value of one almost throughout the sample and therefore would be highly correlated with the 
importer fixed effect for this country. On the other extreme, if a country had no trade 
conditions during the sample period until 2002 or 2003, the TC dummy would take the value 
of zero almost throughout the sample. In either case, the effect of the treatment of trade 
conditions cannot be identified. In order to solve this problem, the benchmark analysis 
focuses on a treatment group that started to have trade conditions no earlier than 1996 but no 
later than 2000 during the sample period; 27 countries fall into this category (see Table 3, 
Treatment Group 1, for a list). 
 
To bring into the analysis some of the countries that had trade conditions but are 
excluded from the above definition of the treatment group, we also consider an alternative 
treatment group for countries that had trade conditions in multiple years including early in 
the sample period. We then compare their trade openness in the second half of the sample 
period versus the first half.  
 
To estimate the treatment effect correctly, one needs to compare the treated group 
with a control group. Ideally, the two groups would be identical in every dimension except 
for one: the presence and absence of trade conditions. Program countries that did not have 
                                                 
7 Subramanian and Wei (2003) have worked with bilateral trade equations both with time-
varying importer and exporter fixed effects and with non-time-varying fixed effects. They 
find the two sets of fixed effects do not make a difference for the question they are studying, 
which is the effect of the WTO membership on members’ imports from other members 
versus their imports from nonmembers.   - 13 -   
 
any trade condition in the 11 years are obvious candidates for the control group. There are 20 
such countries, listed as Control Group 1 in Table 3. The augmented gravity is used to 
control for other ways in which treatment and control groups may be different. As a 
robustness check, all developing IMF member countries without IMF programs during the 
sample are used as an alternative control group (listed as Control Group 2 in Table 3). 
 
Data Sources and Descriptions 
  The sample consists of all developing IMF member countries during 1993–2003. The 
data on program years and trade conditions are from a unique IMF database called 
Monitoring of Fund Arrangements (MONA). Documents on programs and letters of intent on 
some individual countries have been published on the IMF’s external Web site 
(www.imf.org) especially since 1997. Information on the conditions and implementation 
records on these countries/years are publicly available. 
 
The bilateral trade data are from the IMF’s Direction of Trade database, and are 
deflated by the U.S. consumer price index. The data on real GDP and GDP per capita are 
from the World Development Indicators, the International Financial Statistics, and the Penn 
World Table. Control variables in the gravity regressions, such as the dummies for common 
language, colonial ties, shared borders, common currency, and free trade area, are derived 
from the web sites of Andrew Rose (www.haas.berkeley.edu/arose) and Shang-Jin Wei 
(www.nber.org/~wei), with minor corrections. 
 
Features of the Treatment and Control Groups 
 
  It may be useful to take a look at some main characteristics of the countries in the 
treatment and control groups. We first document the proportion of countries in different 
income groups at the beginning and end of the sample. Table 4a shows, both groups have 
countries at different levels of income, though the treatment group tends to have relatively 
more low-income countries. The subsequent analysis will take into account the effect of 
income on trade openness. 
 
  The average tariff level in 1997 was somewhat higher for program countries with 
trade conditions than for program countries without trade conditions, but somewhat lower 
than for countries without programs (Table 4b). The same pattern holds in 2003 as well. All 
three groups exhibit a decline in their tariff levels from 1997 to 2003, with the largest 
decrease registered by program countries with trade conditions. However, given the 
significant heterogeneity within each group, as measured by the standard deviation of either 
the level of or the change in tariffs, the pair-wise differences across the three groups are not 
substantial. In any case, the subsequent analysis will take into account the effect of initial 
conditions (as part of the importer fixed effects) on measured trade openness. 
   - 14 -   
 
Basic Estimates of an Average Effect 
 
We now turn to the regression results. The specification in Column 1 of Table 5 
includes separate importer, exporter, and year fixed effects. The coefficient on the trade 
condition variable is positive and highly significant. According to the point estimate: having 
trade conditions is associated with a higher import volume by 11 percent (e.g., an increase in 
import-to-GDP ratio from 10 to 11.1 percent). In other words, the trade conditions are 
effective in promoting trade, and the average impact is big. 
 
The results for most standard gravity variables—log distance, log GDP, common 
border, common language, and historical/colonial links—are in line with the extant literature. 
One notable new result is that the coefficient on imports by one WTO member country from 
another member is positive (0.31) and statistically significant, but that by one WTO member 
from a nonmember is negative (-0.18) and statistically significant. This complements the 
findings in Subramanian and Wei (2003), and suggests that, for developing country WTO 
members, trade liberalization measures do not automatically extend to imports from non-
WTO members (which are mostly also developing countries). Another interesting result is 
that the coefficient on the dummy for free trade agreements/customs union is not different 
from zero. One possible explanation is that many regional trade agreements among 
developing countries are not effective in reality. 
 
In the second column of Table 5, two dummies for years during an IMF program and 
years after the program, respectively, are added to capture any systematic factors affecting 
trade that are associated with IMF programs. The coefficient on the program dummy is 
negative (-0.09), but that on the post-program dummy is positive (0.05). On average, for a 
program country without trade conditions, imports contract during the program years but 
then recover after the program. Taking into account these features associated with the IMF 
programs, the average effect of trade conditions on trade openness increases to 16 percent. 
 
In the third column of Table 5, two measures of the importer’s real exchange rate 
(RER) are added. A (trade-weighted) multilateral RER produces a positive coefficient: a 1 
percent appreciation of the home currency tends to increase imports from the rest of the 
world by 0.7 percent. A bilateral RER also produces a positive coefficient: a 1 percent 
appreciation of the home currency against the currency of a particular trading partner above 
the average appreciation rate produces an additional 0.1 percent increase in imports from that 
trading partner above and beyond the increase in imports from the rest of the world. It is 
interesting to note that, once the RER variables are included, the negative coefficient on the 
dummy for IMF program years shrinks to –0.04 and in fact is not statistically different from 
zero. This suggests that the contraction in imports associated with IMF program years is 
likely due to a correction of previously overvalued real exchange rate in many program 
countries. In any case, the coefficient on the dummy for trade conditions changes very little 
(0.17 and statistically significant). 
 
In the next three columns of Table 5, the model is augmented with insights from 
Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2004). In particular, a Mills ratio is calculated to account 
for non random occurrence of zero-trade among some country pairs, and an HMR variable is   - 15 -   
 
constructed to account for unobserved heterogeneity in the incidence of exporting firms 
across different countries. Both new regressors are positive and statistically significant, 
supporting the theory in Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2004). However, for the central 
question in this paper, the addition of these two regressors makes little difference: the 
estimated average effect of trade conditions is the same as before (with the point estimates 
slightly larger but not by a statistically significant amount). 
 
Persistence of the Effect 
 
Is the effect of trade conditions temporary (i.e., reversed after the expiration of the 
program) or long-lasting? Does the result survive once the specification deviates from 
assigning equal weights to imports from all trading partners? Table 6 addresses these 
questions. First, in all four regressions in the table, the TC dummy is now split into two 
dummies, representing the years in which trade conditions are applied during IMF programs, 
and the years after the conclusion of these programs, respectively. Second, four different 
weighting schemes are employed. The first column gives equal weights to all trading partners 
for a given importer. The last three columns weight different trading partners in proportion to 
their size, with the latter represented by their log GDP (Column 2), log population (Column 
3), and log initial exports to the importing country in question (Column 4). The coefficient on 
trade conditions during program years is positive in columns 1-3, ranging from 0.12 to 0.14, 
but the coefficient in the last column is –0.09. However, the coefficient on trade conditions 
after the expiration of the programs is positive and significant throughout the four columns, 
ranging from 0.13 to 0.37. Therefore, while the initial effect is somewhat sensitive to the 
weighting scheme (positive and significant in most but not all cases), the effect eventually 
becomes stronger and statistically significant for all specifications. 
 
As another way to trace out the trajectory of the effect of the trade conditions, the TC 
dummy can be decomposed into a sequence of dummies, representing, respectively, the year 
TCs are introduced, the first year after that, the second after that, and so on. Table 7 reports 
the results from this exercise. The three columns weight the observations equally, by 
partners’ log GDP, and log population, respectively. The estimated patterns are similar across 
the specifications. The effect of trade conditions is nil in the year they are introduced 
(probably because the required reforms take time, or some programs were introduced toward 
the end of the year), but rise to 16–18 percent, and then come down to around 10 percent. 
This suggests that the effect of trade conditions is not temporary on average. 
 
Role of the Willingness to Reform 
 
We now attempt to measure “willingness to reform” and gauge its importance in the 
effectiveness of trade reform conditions. This is challenging as a country’s willingness to 
reform is not directly observable or recorded in any standard way. In this paper, we propose 
two proxies. The first proxy (“ownership 1”) is a country’s track record in implementing 
nontrade structural benchmarks (e.g., conditions on monetary or fiscal reforms). Specifically, 
we look at the percentage of non-trade structural benchmark conditions in the first program 
during 1993–2003 that were considered implemented by IMF staff (which is computed by us 
based on the information in the MONA database). Since non-implementation of these   - 16 -   
 
conditions does not automatically interrupt disbursement of IMF loans, our maintained 
assumption is that lower ownership of a program may lead to less implementation. 
Furthermore, if a country is unwilling to implement nontrade structural benchmarks, it is also 
likely to be less willing to implement trade conditions.  
 
The second proxy (“ownership 2”) is our best guess of IMF staff’s subjective 
assessment of a country’s willingness to reform at the time when a program is negotiated. As 
discussed earlier, IMF staff has some discretion over how strong they wish to make a given 
condition to be. In particular, the staff tends to demand more prior actions – the strongest 
form of conditions - in countries that are perceived to have a high risk of going off track in 
subsequent periods.
8 Therefore, staff’s subjective assessment of ownership may be captured 
by the share of non-prior actions in total conditions in the first program during 1993–2003. 
Note that this proxy does not tell us the underlying information that leads the staff to their 
assessment.  
 
Interestingly, the two proxies have a low correlation. This suggests that each may 
capture some different aspects of country characteristics. If the two proxies lead to opposing 
results, the inference on the role of ownership would be difficult. As it turns out, they 
produce results that basically agree with each other. To investigate how a country’s 
willingness to reform affects the effectiveness of trade conditions, the basic model is 
extended to the following specification. 
 
Yi,j,t = α1IMPi + α2EXPj + α3Yeart + Xi,j,tβ + γ1TCi,t + γ2TCi,t*Ownershipi,t + εi,j,t  (2) 
 
Now, the effect of trade conditions is decomposed to two additive components: γ1 + (γ2 
ownership). The estimation results are reported in Table 8. In the first three columns, all 
observations are weighted equally. With the first proxy for ownership (implementation 
record of nontrade structural benchmarks), γ1 is not different from zero statistically, whereas 
γ2 is positive but insignificant. With the second proxy for ownership (share of non-prior 
actions in total conditions) (Column 2), γ1 becomes negative and significant, whereas γ2 is 
positive and significant. When both measures of ownership are included in the same 
regression (in Column 3), both are positive, but only the second measure is significant. The 
coefficient for both proxies is numerically larger. In the last three columns, the country pair 
observations for given importer are weighted by trading partners’ log GDP. The findings 
remain qualitatively unchanged.  
 
So far, ownership is treated as a continuous variable. An alternative is to transform 
each proxy for ownership into two discrete cases: high and low ownership baskets using the 
median value of each proxy as the demarcation point. This transformation places less weight 
on countries that happen to have extreme values of either ownership or change in trade 
                                                 
8 For example, “Review of the 2002 Conditionality Guidelines” 
(www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2005/030305.pdf), page 20, “In both GRA- and PRGF-
supported programs, prior actions are used as a screening device. Prior actions have 
continued to be used more in countries with relatively weak track records.”   - 17 -   
 
volume, and potentially could solve the puzzle of why γ1 is negative in the previous table 
when the second proxy is used. The regression results with high/low ownership 
classifications are reported in Table 9. This time, for both measures, the effect of trade 
conditions is zero in the case of low ownership, but positive and significant in the case of 
high ownership. In the latter case, trade conditions are associated with an increase in trade 
volume by 27–30 percent (e.g., an increase in imports from 10 percent of GDP to 12.7-13 
percent of GDP). 
 
To summarize, the trade conditions are not associated with higher trade volume at 
low values of ownership. All the positive average effect of the trade conditions documented 
in previous tables comes from countries with sufficiently high ownership. These results 
support the view that country ownership is critical for the success of trade conditions. The 
second proxy for ownership suggests that IMF staff are often able to make informed 
judgments about ownership and the odds for real trade reforms at the start of a program. 
  
5.  Robustness Checks and Extensions 
 
Correcting for a Possible Selection Bias 
 
The inclusion of trade conditions in IMF programs may not be a random event. This 
could induce a selection bias if only countries that wanted to do trade reforms on their own 
would invite the IMF to include trade conditions in their programs, generating a positive 
association between trade conditions and trade reforms even though the former does not 
cause the latter. To address this possible bias, we employ a Heckman selection procedure to 
model the decision by the IMF to include trade conditions. Specifically, we look for some 
variables that are correlated with the IMF’s decision to include trade reform conditions in a 
program. The IMF maintains a measure of the restrictiveness of every member country’s 
trade regime—the Trade Restrictive Index (TRI)—calculated by its Policy Development and 
Review Department and used as a guidance indicator for country work.
9 A reasonable 
assumption is that trade conditions are more likely to be introduced in countries that are 
judged to have sufficiently restrictive regimes according to the TRI index (at least during 
most of the sample period). This feature can be utilized to devise a correction for the possible 
selection bias.  
We implement the correction in two steps. First, a probit regression is used to 
estimate the relationship between the trade conditions dummy and the TRI index. Second, an 
implied Mills ratio is calculated to correct for the selection bias in the main regression.  
The first stage Probit regression is reported in Table 10. The analysis confirms a positive 
relationship between a high initial value of the TRI index and an inclusion of trade conditions 
in a program: countries that are judged to have a relatively restrictive trade regime are more 
                                                 
9 The IMF’s TRI index aims to combine information on nontariff barriers with tariff data, and 
takes a value between 1 and 10, with 1 being the most open, and 10 being the most 
restrictive. Due to the TRI’s methodological limitations, its values for individual countries 
are not generally reported in the staff reports. See IMF (2005b) for details.   - 18 -   
 
likely to incur trade reform conditions in their programs. While the TRI may not be an ideal 
measure of a country’s trade regime, its accuracy does not affect our selection equation since 
we are primarily interested in forecasting how IMF selects which countries to have trade 
reform conditions rather than judging which countries ought to have the conditions.  
Tables 11 and 12 report the second-stage regression results that correct for the 
selection bias in this way (i.e., including a Mills ratio variable based on the Probit regression 
in Table 10). While the Mills ratio variable for the selection of trade conditions is statistically 
significant in all regressions, its inclusion does not affect the point estimates or the statistical 
significance of the trade conditions variable. We conclude therefore that the selection bias (in 
terms of the estimated effect of trade conditions on trade openness) is not quantitatively 
important. The ownership effect also remains strong after accounting for the selection bias. 
To be precise, in Table 11 in which two continuous measures of ownership are used, while 
the first proxy for ownership (implementation record of nontrade structural benchmarks) is 
positive but insignificant, the second proxy (share of non-prior actions in all conditions) 
remains positive and significant. This suggests that the second proxy is a more robust 
predictor of subsequent effectiveness of trade conditions. For both proxies, the size of the 
estimated effect of willingness to reform/ownership on trade openness is broadly similar to 
the earlier analysis without controlling for the selection bias. In Table 12, in which high and 
low willingness to reform/ownership cases are represented by two indicator variables, while 
the Mills ratio variable for an endogenous selection of trade conditions is significant, the 
effects of trade conditions are positive and significant in the high ownership cases and 
indifferent from zero in the low ownership cases. 
 
Alternative Control and Treatment Groups 
 
We now check the robustness of our main results to alternative control and treatment 
groups. The control group in the previous analysis is the set of countries that had IMF 
programs but no trade reform conditions. An alternative control group is all developing 
countries that did not go through any IMF program during 1993–2003. Table 13 repeats the 
basic analysis but using this alternative control group. As one can see, the findings remain 
the same. Trade conditions are associated with an increase in trade volume, but the positive 
effect comes from program countries with high degrees of ownership. 
 
The treatment group so far is the set of countries that had at least one IMF program 
with trade reform conditions during the middle part of the sample (1996-2000). A different 
treatment group is a set of countries that had at least seven years of IMF programs with trade 
conditions during 1993-2003. By coincidence, the countries in this treatment group 
(Treatment Group 2 in Table 3) do no overlap with those in the treatment group used in the 
earlier regressions (Treatment Group 1 in Table 3) with the exception of one country. 
Therefore, this provides an independent opportunity to check whether/how trade conditions 
affect trade openness. The results with the new treatment group are reported in Table 14. 
Because most countries in this group had trade conditions in the early part of the sample 
period, the regressions in Table 14 compare their trade volume in the second half of the 
sample with the first half, conditional on other determinants of trade. The first regression 
shows a positive and significant average effect: countries in this group tend to have 10 
percent higher trade in the second half of the sample period than in the first half. The second   - 19 -   
 
and third regressions examine the effect of ownership using the two proxies. The conclusion 
with this different treatment group is remarkably similar to the earlier tables: Only countries 
with high degrees of ownership exhibit significantly higher trade volume in the second part 
of the sample period. 
 
Additional Extensions and Robustness Checks 
 
The next extension investigates whether trade conditions work differently in countries 
eligible for the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) versus non-PRGF countries. 
The PRGF programs are designed for low-income countries with both balance of payments 
problems and structural issues. Many of the PRGF-eligible countries are prolonged users of 
IMF resources. It is conceivable that trade conditions in PRGF programs might have different 
impact from those in non-PRGF programs. To see if this is the case, separate regressions are 
run for these two sets of countries. Table 15 reports the regression results for the PRGF case. 
In the first two columns, the coefficients on the trade conditions dummy are insignificant. In 
the last two columns, where the proxies for ownership and the trade conditions dummy are 
interacted, both proxies for ownership show positive coefficients, but only the second proxy 
is significant. Therefore, the central message is the same as before: The second proxy for 
ownership is a better predictor of the subsequent effectiveness of trade conditions, and the 
positive effect of trade conditions comes entirely from high-ownership programs.  
 
Table 16 repeats the same four regressions for the non-PRGF treatment and control 
groups. The qualitative results are the same as before. The positive coefficients in the first 
two regressions are not statistically different from zero. With the first proxy for ownership, 
the interaction term between ownership and the trade conditions is not significant either. On 
the other hand, with the second proxy, the interaction term is still positive and significant. 
 
Some of the trade conditions might have ambiguous effects on trade openness. For 
example, customs reforms that are designed to strengthen tariff collection could reduce trade 
openness. To be on the conservative side, Table 17 reports regressions excluding the three 
countries in the sample that do not have explicit trade liberalization measures as part of their 
trade conditions. This change strengthens the basic conclusion, i.e., it produces a somewhat 
larger effect of trade conditions on trade openness. 
 
Real Reforms Versus Nominal Implementation 
 
It is possible that the two proxies for ownership are merely noisy estimates of whether 
trade conditions in the program agreements are implemented by the authorities. 
Conceptually, implementation of trade conditions and ownership are not the same thing: 
authorities with a low willingness to undertake trade reforms could implement the trade 
conditions to the letter of an agreement to secure financing from the IMF, but then undo the 
reforms by means not explicitly prohibited in the program agreement. To see this, Table 18 
reports a set of regressions that include an explicit measure of the implementation of trade 
conditions (as assessed by the staff during reviews of the programs), interacted with the 
incidence of trade conditions. The coefficient on the new variable is insignificantly different 
from zero throughout the table. The two ownership measures are positive, though only the   - 20 -   
 
second proxy for ownership is statistically significant. This suggests that nominal 
implementation of trade conditions does not always translate into real and significant trade 
reforms, and that ownership may be a more reliable predictor for the effectiveness of trade 
conditions. 
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
This paper aims to deepen our understanding of whether trade reform conditions in 
IMF programs have succeeded in raising trade openness in developing countries, something 
that the GATT/WTO has not been found to be particularly successful in doing. The paper 
finds several interesting results. 
 
First, trade conditions are effective in increasing trade openness on average, but the 
effect comes almost entirely from programs for which country ownership (willingness to 
reform) is assessed to be high. Two proxies for ownership are constructed using information 
from the implementation record of nontrade structural benchmarks and staff’s judgment on 
countries’ commitment to reform as reflected in the share of prior actions in program 
conditions. Both proxies lead to the same conclusion that reform conditions in IMF programs 
do not automatically lead to real reforms, and that ownership is fundamentally important to 
the success of trade conditionality in increasing a country’s openness to trade.  
 
Second, implementation of trade conditions on paper does not always translate into a 
real and sustained increase in the openness of a country’s trade regime. This suggests that 
many conditions may be implemented to the letter but undone in spirit by other means or 
reversed once a program expires. 
 
This paper represents a first systematic study of the effectiveness of trade reform 
conditions. However, it does not empirically estimate the determinants of a country’s 
willingness to reform due to lack of the relevant data. Linking measures of willingness to 
reform explicitly to domestic policy economy factors would be a fruitful topic for future 




T: Programs  with trade conditionality P: Programs without trade conditions
Country  1993  1994  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000  2001  2002 2003
Albania  T  T  T TT TT   T  TT
Algeria  T  T  T TTT
Argentina  P P P P T  T  TT
Armenia  T TPP P T  TT
Azerbaijan  T TTT TT   TT
Bangladesh  T
Belarus  P P
Benin  T  T  T TTT TT   P  P P
Bolivia  P  P P P T TT   T  T
Bosnia and Herzegovina  T TT   T  TT
Brazil  P P P  P  P
Bulgaria  P T T TT   T  TT
Burkina Faso  T  T  T TTT TT   T  TP
Cambodia  T  T TT TT   T  TT
Cameroon  P  P P P P P T  T  TT
Cape Verde  T TT   P P
Central African Republic  T  T T TT   T 
Chad  T TTT TP   P  P P
Colombia  P P  P  P P
Congo, Dem. Rep. of  TT
Congo, Rep. of  T  T P P
Costa Rica  P  P  P P P
Côte d'Ivoire  P  P P P T TT   T 
Croatia  P  P P T T T T  T  TP
Czech Republic  P  P 
Djibouti  P P P P P  P  P
Dominica  P P
Dominican Republic  P  P  P
Ecuador  T  T P  P  P
Egypt  TT   T T T T
El Salvador  P  P  P P P P P P 
Equatorial Guinea  TT   T T
Estonia  P  P  P T T P P P  P 
Ethiopia  T T T T T  TT
Gabon  P  T T T T T T  T  T
Gambia, The        T T T  T 
Georgia  P T T T T T  TT
Ghana  T T T T T T  T  TP
Guatemala  P P
Guinea  T T T T  P  P P
Guinea-Bissau  T T T T P  P  P P
Guyana  T  T T T T T T  T  P P
Haiti  T T T T T
Honduras  T T  T  T
Hungary  P  P  T T T




T: Programs  with trade conditionality P: Programs without trade conditions
Country 1993  1994  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000  2001  2002 2003
Indonesia  T T T TP   P P
Jordan  T  T T T T T TT   T T
Kazakhstan  T  T T T T T TT   T
Kenya  T  T  P P P P TT   T T
Korea, Republic of  P P P P 
Kyrgyz Republic  P  T  T T T T T TT   P P
Lao P.D.R.  T  T  T T T  T T
Latvia  P  P  T T P P T TT   P
Lesotho  P  P P P P  P P
Lithuania  P  T  T T T TT   T T
Macedonia, FYR  P P P P P P  P  P T
Madagascar  T T T T P  P P
Malawi  P  T T T T TT   T T
Mali  T T T T P  P  P P
Mauritania  T T T T T TT   T
Mexico  P P P P P 
Moldova  T  T  T T T T T TT   T T
Mongolia  T  T  T T P P P P  P  P P
Mozambique  P  P T T T T TT   T T
Nepal  T
Nicaragua  T  T T T T T TT   P P
Niger  P  P T T T T P  P  P P
Nigeria  TT  
Pakistan  P  T  T T T T T TT   T T
Panama  T T T T T TP   P
Papua New Guinea  P P P P  P 
Paraguay  T
Peru  P  P  P P P P P P  P  P P
Philippines  T  T T T P P P 
Poland  P  P  P P
Romania  P  P P P P T TT   P P
Russian Federation  T T T T T T
Rwanda  T T TT   P P
São Tomé and Príncipe  TT   T T
Senegal  T  T T T T T TT   P
Serbia and Montenegro  T T
Sierra Leone  P  P P  P P
Slovak  P  P P
Sri Lanka T  T
Tajikistan  T T TT   P P
Tanzania  P P P P TT   T T
Thailand  P P P P 
Togo  P  P P P
Turkey  P  P P P P  P  T T
Uganda  T  T T T T T TP P











1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999  2000  2001  2002 2003 Total
Fund-supported programs  23 33 28 32 21 21 20  23  21  17 15 254
IMF-supported Programs with trade condition  11 15 17 19 10 16 13  12  10  8 6 137
  PRGF  8 7 5 11 4 11 7  6  7  2 2 70
  EFF  1 3 2 5 3 3 2  0  0  1 0 20
  SBA  2 5 10 3 3 2 4  6  3  5 4 47
Number of trade conditions  23 29 36 59 47 77 67  28  26  24 11 427
  Prior Action (in percent)  9 34 33 41 62 29 24  25  42  17 45 33
  Structural Benchmark (in percent)  78 55 47 46 30 57 46  50  38  71 36 50
  Performance Criteria (in 
percent) 
13 10 19 14 9 14 30  25  19  13 18 17
Nature of trade condition  23 29 36 59 47 77 67  28  26  24 11 427
Tariff reduction & rationalization  6 6 14 22 13 25 19  15  2  2 4 128
Removal of licensing requirement  10 10 8 9 6 5 4  3  2  1 0 58
Elimination of exemptions  2 0 0 6 3 7 5  1  1  0 1 26
Removal of quantitative restrictions  1 4 2 4 4 2 5  0  4  0 0 26
Custom reform  1 1 0 7 6
23 14 1  12  10 0 75
   Other measures  3 8 12 11 15 15 20 8  5  11 6 114
Table 2.  Summary Statistics of Trade Conditions, 1993-2003 
T: Programs  with trade conditionality P: Programs without trade conditions
Country  1993  1994  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000  2001  2002 2003
Ukraine  T T T T T T  T  T
Uruguay  P P P P T  T  TT
Uzbekistan  T T T
Venezuela  P P
Vietnam  TT   T T T T  TT
Yemen  P T T T T  T 
Yugoslavia  P  P
Zambia  P P T T  T  TT
Zimbabwe  T T T 
               Table 1. IMF-Supported with and without Trade Conditionality (continued) 
Notes.  PRGF = Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility. 
   EFF = Extended Fund Facility 
             SBA = Stand-By Arrangement   - 24 - 
 
 
Treatment Group 1  Control Group 1 Control Group 2 Treatment Group 2 
Argentina  Belarus Angola Albania 
Bolivia Brazil Antigua and Barbuda  Benin 
Bosnia & Herzegovina  Colombia Bahamas, The Burkina Faso 
Bulgaria  Costa Rica  Kingdom of Bahrain Cambodia 
Cameroon  Czech  Republic Barbados Gabon 
Cape Verde  Djibouti  Belize  Ghana 
Côte  '  d’Ivoire Dominica  Burundi  Guinea-Bissau 
Croatia Dominican  Republic Chile Guyana 
Estonia El  Salvador China Jordan 
Gambia, The  Guatemala  Hong Kong SAR Kazakhstan 
Georgia Korea,  Republic  of Comoros Kenya 
Guinea Mexico Cyprus Kyrgyz  Republic 
Hungary  Papua New Guinea  Fiji  Lao P.D.R. 
Indonesia Peru  Grenada  Latvia 
Madagascar Poland  India Lithuania 
Mali  Sierra Leone  Iran, I.R. of Malawi 
Mozambique Slovak  Israel  Mauritania 
Niger Thailand Jamaica  Moldova 
Nigeria Togo  Kiribati  Mozambique 
Romania Venezuela Kuwait Nicaragua 
Rwanda Lebanon  Pakistan 
São Tomé and Príncipe  Liberia Senegal 
Tajikistan  Malaysia Uganda 
Tanzania Maldives  Ukraine 
Uruguay  Mauritius Vietnam 
Yemen  Morocco 








St. Kitts and Nevis 
St. Lucia 










   Notes: The groups are defined as follows:
   Treatment Group 1: countries with trade conditions during 1995-2001.
   Control Group 1: countries went through IMF-supported programs without trade conditions. 
   Control Group 2: developing countries that did not went through programs.
   Treatment Group 2: countries with trade conditions for more than 7 years.
   Mozambique is in both treatment groups 1 and 2. No other country appears in more than one group.
Table 3. List of Countries in the Sample  - 25 - 
 
Table 4a. Characteristics of Countries in the Treatment and Control Groups 
 
<800 800 -- 3000 >3000 <800 800 -- 3000 >3000
Program countries with trade conditions 63.0 27.4 9.6 54.8 28.8 16.4
Program countries without trade conditions 20.0 45.0 35.0 20.0 40.0 40.0
Developing countries without programs 22.0 36.6 41.5 14.6 31.7 53.7
Proportion of Countries in Different Income Groups
1993 2003













Program countries with trade conditions 16.8 8.0 13.5 6.2 -3.3 6.0
Program countries without trade conditions 12.9 4.8 10.3 4.3 -2.6 3.9
Developing countries without programs 17.1 10.7 13.9 9.6 -3.2 5.3
Average Tariff  (in percent)
Changes from 1997 to 2003 1997 2003
 




Dependent variable: real bilateral imports in log (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6)
Trade condition  0.109 0.162 0.167 0.117  0.169 0.177
(0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041)  (0.042) (0.043)
IMF program  -0.092 -0.037 -0.094 -0.041
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Post-IMF program  0.046 0.078 0.040 0.069
(0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.041)
Mills ratio for nonzero trade  0.467  0.466 0.525
(0.102)  (0.102) (0.103)
HMR probability of nonzero trade  0.435  0.441 0.370
(0.164)  (0.164) (0.163)








Importer WTO member, but not partner  -0.178 -0.158 -0.191 -0.159  -0.141 -0.170
(0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.098)  (0.098) (0.098)
Importer and partner WTO 
members 
0.306 0.327 0.281 0.318  0.338 0.292
(0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067)  (0.067) (0.066)
Common border  0.798 0.797 0.788 0.669  0.666 0.690
(0.201) (0.201) (0.201) (0.213)  (0.213) (0.213)
Ever colony  1.423 1.422 1.425 1.395  1.395 1.390
(0.220) (0.220) (0.219) (0.222)  (0.222) (0.222)
Common 
colony 
1.074 1.073 1.062 1.064  1.063 1.049
(0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118)  (0.118) (0.118)
Common language  0.67 0.67 0.667 0.552  0.549 0.586
(0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.111)  (0.111) (0.111)
Common currency  0.119 0.119 0.117 -0.077  -0.081 -0.015
(0.249) (0.249) (0.249) (0.279)  (0.279) (0.279)
Log distance  -1.471 -1.471 -1.463 -1.273  -1.269 -1.317
(0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.113)  (0.113) (0.113)
Free trade area  -0.151 -0.154 -0.137 -0.357  -0.36 -0.358
(0.099) (0.099) (0.098) (0.109)  (0.109) (0.109)
Log real GDP importer  0.863 0.749 0.652 0.797  0.683 0.595
(0.139) (0.140) (0.140) (0.140)  (0.141) (0.140)
Log real GDP exporter  0.409 0.410 0.424 0.379  0.379 0.408
(0.163) (0.163) (0.164) (0.169)  (0.169) (0.170)
Log population importer  -1.581 -1.312 -0.965 -1.052  -0.773 -0.617
(0.288) (0.292) (0.294) (0.427)  (0.429) (0.432)
Log population exporter  -0.113 -0.128 0.008 0.61  0.606 0.605
(0.355) (0.354) (0.353) (0.175)  (0.176) (0.176)
Observations  49068 49068 49068 49068  49068 49068
R-squared  0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71  0.71 0.71
   Note: Standard errors are based on country pair clustering. Separate importer, exporter, and year fixed effects are 
included but not reported. 
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Trade Conditions during IMF program  0.140 0.115 0.118  -0.095
(0.042) (0.039) (0.040)  (0.035)
Trade conditions after IMF program  0.374 0.347 0.354  0.126
(0.073) (0.068) (0.069)  (0.059)
Real exchange rate 
(multilateral) 
0.007 0.006 0.007  0.006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)
Real exchange rate 
(bilateral) 
0.001 0.001 0.001  0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)
IMF program  -0.027 -0.015 -0.014  0.057
(0.029) (0.028) (0.028)  (0.025)
Post-IMF program  -0.003 0.007 0.011  0.054
(0.043) (0.041) (0.042)  (0.035)
Importer WTO member, but not partner  -0.206 -0.227 -0.215  -0.227
(0.098) (0.097) (0.098)  (0.101)
Importer and partner WTO 
members 
0.256 0.241 0.250  0.151
(0.066) (0.063) (0.065)  (0.053)
Common border  0.689 0.708 0.719  0.520
(0.213) (0.208) (0.212)  (0.189)
Ever colony  1.390 1.390 1.386  1.644
(0.222) (0.210) (0.213)  (0.250)
Common 
colony 
1.049 1.066 1.054  1.141
(0.118) (0.117) (0.118)  (0.128)
Common language 0.585 0.578 0.553  0.450
(0.111) (0.108) (0.108)  (0.114)
Common currency  -0.017 -0.013 -0.046  0.264
(0.278) (0.271) (0.271)  (0.294)
Log distance  -1.315 -1.326 -1.306  -1.359
(0.113) (0.110) (0.110)  (0.122)
Free trade area -0.359 -0.379 -0.368  -0.030
(0.109) (0.105) (0.107)  (0.108)
Log real GDP importer  0.601 0.664 0.661  1.031
(0.140) (0.135) (0.136)  (0.137)
Log real GDP exporter  0.406 0.405 0.431  0.412
(0.170) (0.161) (0.162)  (0.199)
Log population importer  -0.766 -0.856 -0.776  -1.441
(0.432) (0.417) (0.422)  (0.431)
Log population exporter  0.607 0.617 0.576  0.765
(0.176) (0.170) (0.171)  (0.288)
Mills ratio for nonzero trade  0.526 0.443 0.425  0.332
(0.103) (0.101) (0.103)  (0.163)
HMR probability of nonzero trade  0.372 0.342 0.370  0.189
(0.163) (0.158) (0.159)  (0.175)
Observations 49068 49068 49068  34306
R-squared 0.71 0.72 0.72  0.76
Table 6.  “During  -  Program” and “Post-Program” Effects in Weighted Regressions
   Notes: Standard errors are based on country pair clustering. Separate importer, exporter, and year fixed effects are 
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(1) (2)  (3)
Year trade conditions introduced 0.030 0.024  0.027
(0.044) (0.040) (0.041)
1st year after trade conditions was 
introduced 
0.172 0.154  0.158
(0.046) (0.043) (0.044)
2nd year  0.138 0.113  0.113
(0.049) (0.046) (0.047)
Third year  0.160 0.135  0.139
(0.048) (0.046) (0.046)
Fourth year  0.127 0.101  0.104
(0.050) (0.048) (0.048)
Fifth year  0.155 0.123  0.127
(0.053) (0.050) (0.051)
Sixth year  0.109 0.085  0.091
(0.057) (0.054) (0.055)
Mills ratio for non-zero trade  0.527 0.444  0.426
(0.103) (0.101) (0.103)
HMR probability of nonzero trade 0.363 0.334  0.362
(0.164) (0.158) (0.159)
Importer WTO member, but not partner -0.180 -0.200  -0.188
(0.099) (0.099) (0.099)
Importer and partner WTO 
members 
0.281 0.267  0.276
(0.068) (0.065) (0.066)
Common border  0.693 0.712  0.723
(0.213) (0.208) (0.212)




1.050 1.067  1.054
(0.118) (0.117) (0.118)
Common language  0.589 0.582  0.557
(0.111) (0.108) (0.109)
Common currency  -0.011 -0.008  -0.040
(0.279) (0.271) (0.272)
Log distance  -1.321 -1.331  -1.311
(0.113) (0.110) (0.110)
Free trade area  -0.356 -0.377  -0.365
(0.109) (0.105) (0.107)
Log real GDP importer  0.683 0.742  0.740
(0.141) (0.136) (0.137)
Log real GDP exporter  0.408 0.406  0.432
(0.170) (0.161) (0.162)
Log population importer  -0.757 -0.841  -0.763
(0.430) (0.414) (0.420)
Log population exporter  0.608 0.619  0.578
(0.175) (0.170) (0.171)
Real exchange rate 
(multilateral) 
0.007 0.007  0.007
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Real exchange rate 
(bilateral) 
0.001 0.001  0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations  49068 49068  49068
R-squared  0.71 0.72  0.72
Table 7. Time Profile of the Impact from Trade Conditions 
   Notes: Standard errors are based on country pair clustering. Separate importer, exporter, and  
year fixed effects are included but not reported.   - 29 - 
 
Weighting: 
Trade condition  0.036 -0.514 -0.704 0.030  -0.578  -0.746
(0.114) (0.199) (0.196) (0.103) (0.188)  (0.188)
Trade condition * ownership 1  0.228 0.260 0.197  0.231
(0.155) (0.152) (0.141) (0.139)
Trade condition * ownership 2  0.795 0.829 0.840  0.870
(0.233) (0.227) (0.218)  (0.214)
Importer WTO member, but not partner -0.173 -0.203 -0.208 -0.195  -0.226  -0.231
(0.098) (0.098) (0.098) (0.098) (0.098)  (0.098)
Importer and partner WTO 
members 
0.288 0.260 0.254 0.273  0.243  0.238
(0.066) (0.067) (0.067) (0.064) (0.064)  (0.064)
Common border  0.691 0.688 0.689 0.710  0.707  0.708
(0.213) (0.213) (0.213) (0.208) (0.208)  (0.208)
Ever colony  1.389 1.391 1.390 1.390  1.391  1.391
(0.222) (0.222) (0.222) (0.210) (0.210)  (0.210)
Common 
colony 
1.050 1.047 1.047 1.067  1.064  1.064
(0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.117) (0.117)  (0.117)
Common language  0.587 0.583 0.585 0.579  0.576  0.577
(0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.108) (0.107)  (0.107)
Common currency  -0.013 -0.018 -0.015 -0.010  -0.015  -0.013
(0.279) (0.278) (0.279) (0.271) (0.271)  (0.271)
Log distance  -1.318 -1.312 -1.313 -1.328  -1.322  -1.323
(0.113) (0.112) (0.113) (0.110) (0.109)  (0.109)
Free trade area  -0.358 -0.360 -0.359 -0.378  -0.380  -0.380
(0.108) (0.109) (0.108) (0.105) (0.105)  (0.105)
Log real GDP importer  0.611 0.658 0.679 0.673  0.725  0.744
(0.141) (0.141) (0.141) (0.136) (0.136)  (0.136)
Log real GDP exporter  0.407 0.410 0.409 0.406  0.409  0.408
(0.170) (0.169) (0.170) (0.161) (0.161)  (0.161)
Log population importer  -0.591 -0.414 -0.375 -0.688  -0.495  -0.460
(0.431) (0.434) (0.432) (0.416) (0.417)  (0.416)
Log population exporter  0.607 0.599 0.602 0.618  0.610  0.612
(0.176) (0.175) (0.176) (0.170) (0.170)  (0.170)
Real exchange rate 
(multilateral) 
0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006  0.006  0.006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)
Real exchange rate 
(bilateral) 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001  0.001  0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)
Mills ratio for nonzero trade  0.527 0.525 0.526 0.443  0.442  0.443
(0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.101) (0.101)  (0.101)
HMR probability of nonzero trade  0.368 0.377 0.375 0.338  0.347  0.345
(0.163) (0.163) (0.163) (0.158) (0.158)  (0.158)
IMF program  -0.039 -0.019 -0.015 -0.027  -0.006  -0.002
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.027) (0.028)  (0.028)
Post IMF program  0.075 0.100 0.107 0.084  0.113  0.119
(0.040) (0.043) (0.042) (0.038) (0.040)  (0.039)
Observations  49068 49068 49068 49068  49068  49068
R-squared  0.71 0.71 0.71 0.72  0.72  0.72
Equally weighted Weighted by Partners' 
Log  real GDP 
Table 8. Role of Ownership
   Notes: Standard errors are based on country pair clustering. Separate importer, exporter, and year fixed 
effects are included but not reported.   - 30 - 
 
(1)  (2)
Trade condition * High ownership 1 0.297 
(0.050)
Trade condition * Low ownership 1 0.034 
(0.060)
Trade condition * High ownership 2 0.272
(0.061)
Trade condition * Low ownership 2 0.076
(0.051)
Importer WTO member, but not partner -0.162  -0.206
(0.097) (0.098)




Common border  0.691  0.689
(0.213) (0.213)






Common language 0.586  0.585
(0.111) (0.111)
Common currency  -0.015  -0.016
(0.279) (0.278)
Log distance  -1.315  -1.314
(0.113) (0.113)
Free trade area  -0.359  -0.359
(0.109) (0.109)
Log real GDP importer  0.587  0.620
(0.140) (0.140)
Log real GDP exporter  0.408  0.411
(0.170) (0.169)
Log population importer  -0.619  -0.506
(0.431) (0.432)
Log population exporter  0.605  0.600
(0.176) (0.175)








IMF program  -0.026  -0.033
(0.029) (0.029)
Post IMF program  0.075  0.086
(0.041) (0.042)
Mills ratio for non-zero trade 0.532  0.526
(0.103) (0.103)
HMR probability of nonzero trade 0.372  0.373
(0.163) (0.163)
IMF program  -0.026  -0.033
(0.029) (0.029)
Post IMF program  0.075  0.086
(0.041) (0.042)
Observations  49068  49068
R-squared  0.71  0.71
Table 9. High versus Low Ownership Relative to Median 
   Notes: Standard errors are based on country pair clustering. Separate importer, exporter, and year 
fixed effects are included but not reported.   - 31 - 
 
 
Dependent variable: dummy for trade conditions
Trade Restrictive Index  0.093 
(0.045) 
Constant  -1.568 
(0.208) 
Pseudo R2  0.03 
Table 10: Predicting Which Countries/Years Have Trade Conditions 
Using IMF’s Trade Restrictive Index (Probit Regression) 
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(1) (2)  (3)
Trade condition  0.068 -0.069 -0.642
(0.046) (0.117) (0.199)
Trade condition * ownership 1  0.224
(0.155)
Trade condition * ownership 2  0.811
(0.233)
Importer WTO member, but not partner  -0.197 -0.200 -0.232
(0.098) (0.098) (0.098)
Importer and partner WTO members  0.266 0.262 0.232
(0.066) (0.067) (0.067)
Common border  0.691 0.692 0.689
(0.213) (0.213) (0.213)
Ever colony  1.390 1.389 1.391
(0.222) (0.222) (0.222)
Common colony  1.049 1.050 1.046
(0.118) (0.118) (0.118)
Common language  0.586 0.587 0.584
(0.111) (0.111) (0.111)
Common currency  -0.015 -0.013 -0.018
(0.279) (0.279) (0.279)
Log distance  -1.317 -1.319 -1.313
(0.113) (0.113) (0.112)
Free trade area  -0.359 -0.359 -0.361
(0.109) (0.108) (0.109)
Log real GDP importer  0.567 0.582 0.630
(0.141) (0.142) (0.141)
Log real GDP exporter  0.409 0.408 0.411
(0.170) (0.170) (0.169)
Log population importer  -0.654 -0.627 -0.448
(0.432) (0.431) (0.434)
Log population exporter  0.605 0.608 0.600
(0.176) (0.176) (0.176)
Real exchange rate (multilateral)  0.007 0.006 0.006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Real exchange rate (bilateral)  0.001 0.001 0.001
0.000 0.000  0.000
Mills ratio for TC selection  -0.115 -0.114 -0.120
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Mills ratio for nonzero trade  0.526 0.527 0.526
(0.103) (0.103) (0.103)
HMR probability of nonzero trade  0.369 0.367 0.376
(0.163) (0.163) (0.163)
IMF program  -0.033 -0.03  -0.010
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Post IMF program  0.087 0.092 0.119
(0.041) (0.040) (0.042)
Observations  49068 49068  49068
R-squared  0.71 0.71  0.71
Table 11: Accounting for Endogenous Trade Condtions Using Trade Restrictive Index
Note 1: Standard errors are based on country pair clustering. Separate importer, exporter, and year fixed effects are 
included but not reported.   - 33 - 
 
(1) (2)
Trade condition * High ownership 1  0.188
(0.052)
Trade condition * Low ownership 1  -0.077
(0.064)
Trade condition * High ownership 2  0.162
(0.063)
Trade condition * Low ownership 2  -0.039
(0.054)
Mills ratio for non-zero trade  0.533 0.527
(0.103) (0.103)
HMR probability of nonzero trade  0.372 0.373
(0.163) (0.163)
Importer WTO member, but not partner  -0.189 -0.235
(0.098) (0.099)




Common border  0.692 0.690
(0.213) (0.213)






Common language  0.586 0.585
(0.111) (0.111)
Common currency  -0.015 -0.016
(0.279) (0.279)
Log distance  -1.316 -1.315
(0.113) (0.113)
Free trade area  -0.360 -0.360
(0.109) (0.109)
Log real GDP importer  0.558 0.591
(0.141) (0.140)
Log real GDP exporter  0.408 0.412
(0.170) (0.169)
Log population importer  -0.656 -0.541
(0.431) (0.432)
Log population exporter  0.606 0.600
(0.176) (0.175)








IMF program  -0.018 -0.024
(0.029) (0.029)
Post-IMF program  0.093 0.104
(0.041) (0.042)
Mills ratio for TC selection  -0.116 -0.118
(0.031) (0.031)
Observations  49068 49068
R-squared  0.71 0.71
Table 12. Discrete Measures of Ownership, with Correction for Selection Bias 
   Notes: Standard errors are based on country pair clustering. Separate importer, exporter, and year fixed effects 
are included but not reported.   - 34 - 
 
 
(Sample: Treatment Group 1 and Control Group 2 in Table 3)
(1) (2)  (3)
Trade condition  0.145 -0.045  -0.546
(0.045) (0.133)  (0.228)
Trade Condition * Ownership 1  0.286 
(0.186) 
Trade Condition * Ownership 2  0.763
(0.253)
Importer WTO member, but not partner  -0.22 -0.223  -0.241
(0.087) (0.087)  (0.087)
Importer and partner WTO 
members 
0.216 0.213  0.196
(0.054) (0.054)  (0.054)
Common border  0.199 0.205  0.228
(0.276) (0.276)  (0.276)
Ever colony  1.433 1.431  1.432
(0.205) (0.205)  (0.205)
Common 
colony 
0.633 0.633  0.632
(0.090) (0.090)  (0.090)
Common language  0.183 0.19  0.213
(0.097) (0.096)  (0.098)
Common currency  -0.209 -0.197  -0.156
(0.251) (0.251)  (0.252)
Log distance  -1.235 -1.244  -1.28
(0.101) (0.100)  (0.102)
Free trade area  -0.112 -0.111  -0.109
(0.110) (0.110)  (0.110)
Log real GDP importer  0.959 0.966  1.009
(0.153) (0.153)  (0.154)
Log real GDP exporter  0.300 0.298  0.310
(0.179) (0.179)  (0.178)
Log real population importer  -0.576 -0.577  -0.601
(0.151) (0.151)  (0.151)
Log real population exporter  1.439 1.427  1.310
(0.439) (0.439)  (0.441)
Bilateral real exchange 
rate 
0.000 0.000  0.000
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)
Mills ratio for nonzero trade  0.360 0.361  0.359
(0.093) (0.093)  (0.093)
HMR probability of nonzero trade  0.811 0.797  0.742
(0.148) (0.148)  (0.151)
IMF program  -0.220 -0.204  -0.173
(0.054) (0.052)  (0.057)
Post IMF program  -0.043 -0.024  0.020
(0.083) (0.079)  (0.088)
Observations  56755 56755  56755
R-squared  0.73 0.73  0.73
Table 13. Alternative Control Group
   Notes: Standard errors are based on country pair clustering. Separate importer, exporter, and year fixed effects are 
included but not reported.   - 35 - 
 
 
(1) (2)  (3)
Trade condition 0.096 -0.309 -0.490
(0.048) (0.089) (0.482)
Trade condition * Ownership1  0.590 
(0.113)
Trade condition * Ownership 2  0.601
(0.491)
Importer WTO member, but not partner  -0.159 -0.137 -0.167
(0.101) (0.101) (0.101)
Importer and partner WTO members  0.343 0.361  0.334
(0.066) (0.066) (0.067)
Common border  0.810 0.799  0.808
(0.220) (0.220) (0.220)
Ever colony  1.338 1.338  1.339
(0.210) (0.211) (0.210)
Common colony  1.255 1.255  1.254
(0.116) (0.116) (0.116)
Common language  0.599 0.587  0.597
(0.118) (0.118) (0.118)
Common currency  -0.024 -0.046 -0.028
(0.311) (0.311) (0.311)
Log distance  -1.246 -1.228 -1.243
(0.129) (0.129) (0.129)
Free trade area  0.384 0.381  0.384
(0.127) (0.127) (0.127)
Log real GDP importer  0.554 0.616  0.566
(0.173) (0.173) (0.173)
Log real GDP exporter  0.472 0.471  0.471
(0.195) (0.195) (0.195)
Log real population importer  0.146 -0.02  0.196
(0.506) (0.506) (0.507)
Log real population exporter  0.551 0.539  0.549
(0.194) (0.194) (0.194)
Bilateral real exchange rate  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mills ratio for nonzero trade  0.183 0.182  0.182
(0.104) (0.104) (0.104)
HMR probability of nonzero trade  0.293 0.319  0.297
(0.186) (0.186) (0.186)
IMF program  -0.163 -0.156 -0.161
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
Post IMF program  -0.196 -0.191 -0.193
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054)
Observations  41375 41375 41375
R-squared  0.71 0.71  0.71
Table 14. Continuous Trade Reforms
Note 1: Standard errors are based on country pair clustering. Separate importer, exporter, and year fixed effects are 
included but not reported. 
(Sample: Treatment group 2 and control group 1 in Table A3.)
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(1) (2) (3)  (4)
Trade condition  0.002 -0.001 -0.189 -0.523
(0.069) (0.069) (0.153)  (0.259)
Trade condition * ownership 1 0.298 
(0.196) 
Trade condition * ownership 2 0.589
(0.291)
IMF program  0.193 0.201 0.211  0.230
(0.058) (0.057) (0.056)  (0.059)
Post IMF program  0.321 0.333 0.359  0.361
(0.097) (0.097) (0.093)  (0.099)
Importer WTO member, but not partner  -0.588 -0.534 -0.539 -0.522
(0.201) (0.193) (0.193)  (0.193)
Importer and partner WTO members  0.241 0.184 0.179  0.199
(0.134) (0.134) (0.134)  (0.134)
Common border  0.862 0.870 0.873  0.862
(0.331) (0.353) (0.353)  (0.353)
Ever colony  1.764 1.273 1.272  1.277
(0.371) (0.430) (0.430)  (0.430)
Common colony  0.769 0.886 0.890  0.885
(0.145) (0.141) (0.141)  (0.141)
Common language  0.292 0.467 0.469  0.459
(0.122) (0.169) (0.169)  (0.168)
Common currency  0.488 0.749 0.751  0.736
(0.243) (0.325) (0.325)  (0.325)
Log distance  -1.696 -2.068 -2.070 -2.057
(0.087) (0.198) (0.198)  (0.198)
Free trade area  1.668 1.539 1.529  1.539
(0.288) (0.301) (0.302)  (0.301)
Log real GDP importer  0.243 0.283 0.293  0.263
(0.228) (0.226) (0.226)  (0.226)
Log real GDP exporter  -0.133 -0.042 -0.046 -0.039
(0.272) (0.273) (0.275)  (0.272)
Log population importer  -2.353 -3.679 -3.662 -3.333
(0.601) (0.790) (0.791)  (0.804)
Log population exporter  1.648 1.325 1.331  1.312
(0.590) (0.307) (0.309)  (0.306)
Real exchange rate (multilateral)  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)
Real exchange rate (bilateral)  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)
Mills ratio for nonzero trade  2.047 2.047  2.042
(0.201) (0.201)  (0.202)
HMR probability of nonzero trade  0.299 0.295  0.317
(0.273) (0.273)  (0.272)
Observations  17519 17519 17519 17519
R-squared  0.64 0.64 0.64  0.64
Table 15. PRGF Programs
Note 1: Standard errors are based on country pair clustering. Separate importer, exporter, and year fixed effects 
are included but not reported.     - 37 - 
 
 
(1) (2) (3)  (4)
Trade condition  0.054 0.056 -0.005  -0.445
(0.059) (0.059) (0.182)  (0.308)
Trade condition * ownership 1  0.089 
(0.264) 
Trade condition * ownership 2  0.580
(0.345)
IMF program  -0.043 -0.044 -0.044  -0.033
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035)  (0.035)
Post IMF program  0.041 0.039 0.037  0.054
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047)  (0.047)
Importer WTO member, but not partner  0.003 0.006 0.005  -0.026
(0.110) (0.110) (0.110)  (0.111)
Importer and partner WTO 
members 
0.193 0.197 0.197  0.166
(0.075) (0.075) (0.075)  (0.076)
Common border  0.588 0.354 0.355  0.356
(0.225) (0.238) (0.238)  (0.238)
Ever colony  1.163 1.187 1.187  1.188
(0.271) (0.272) (0.272)  (0.272)
Common 
colony 
2.369 2.360 2.360  2.358
(0.224) (0.225) (0.225)  (0.225)
Common language 0.884 0.637 0.638  0.640
(0.115) (0.146) (0.147)  (0.146)
Common currency  1.276 0.847 0.850  0.851
(0.962) (0.975) (0.976)  (0.974)
Log distance  -1.317 -0.941 -0.942  -0.944
(0.042) (0.134) (0.134)  (0.134)
Free trade area  -0.058 -0.128 -0.127  -0.128
(0.100) (0.107) (0.107)  (0.107)
Log real GDP importer  0.204 0.108 0.099  0.195
(0.217) (0.218) (0.217)  (0.220)
Log real GDP exporter  0.651 0.568 0.568  0.570
(0.196) (0.204) (0.204)  (0.204)
Log population importer  -1.401 -0.330 -0.345  -0.248
(0.454) (0.589) (0.590)  (0.585)
Log population exporter -0.838 0.284 0.285  0.285
(0.426) (0.205) (0.205)  (0.205)
Real exchange rate 
(multilateral) 
0.012 0.012 0.012  0.012
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)
Real exchange rate 
(bilateral) 
0.002 0.002 0.002  0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)
Mills ratio for nonzero trade  0.106 0.106  0.111
(0.116) (0.116)  (0.117)
HMR probability of nonzero trade  0.598 0.596  0.594
(0.196) (0.196)  (0.196)
Observations  31232 31232 31232  31232
R-squared  0.76 0.76 0.76  0.76
Table 16. Non-PRGF Programs
   Notes: Standard errors are based on country pair clustering. Separate importer, exporter, and year fixed effects are 
included but not reported.   - 38 - 
 
 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)
Trade condition 0.163 0.173  0.063  -0.494
(0.046) (0.046) (0.124)  (0.211)
Trade condition * ownership 1 0.184 
(0.175) 
Trade condition * ownership 2 0.781
(0.253)
IMF program  -0.042 -0.046 -0.043  -0.025
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030)  (0.031)
Post IMF program  0.090 0.081  0.086  0.107
(0.042) (0.042) (0.041)  (0.043)
Importer WTO member, but not partner  -0.202 -0.180 -0.184  -0.218
(0.100) (0.100) (0.100)  (0.100)
Importer and partner WTO members  0.297 0.307  0.302  0.270
(0.067) (0.067) (0.067)  (0.067)
Common border  0.797 0.674  0.676  0.674
(0.213) (0.226) (0.226)  (0.226)
Ever colony  1.470 1.442  1.442  1.443
(0.233) (0.235) (0.235)  (0.235)
Common colony  1.044 1.028  1.028  1.025
(0.127) (0.127) (0.127)  (0.127)
Common language  0.693 0.587  0.589  0.586
(0.086) (0.116) (0.116)  (0.116)
Common currency  -0.104 -0.270 -0.268  -0.269
(0.254) (0.285) (0.285)  (0.285)
Log distance  -1.451 -1.269 -1.270  -1.267
(0.038) (0.116) (0.116)  (0.116)
Free trade area  -0.140 -0.348 -0.347  -0.350
(0.099) (0.109) (0.109)  (0.109)
Log real GDP importer  0.670 0.604  0.609  0.668
(0.141) (0.142) (0.142)  (0.143)
Log real GDP exporter  0.401 0.376  0.376  0.378
(0.169) (0.175) (0.176)  (0.175)
Log population importer  -1.011 -0.557 -0.527  -0.346
(0.300) (0.441) (0.440)  (0.444)
Log population exporter -0.073 0.609  0.611  0.605
(0.364) (0.180) (0.180)  (0.180)
Real exchange rate (multilateral)  0.006 0.006  0.006  0.006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)
Real exchange rate (bilateral)  0.001 0.001  0.001  0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)
Mills ratio for nonzero trade  0.494  0.495  0.494
(0.104) (0.104)  (0.104)
HMR probability of nonzero trade  0.413  0.411  0.417
(0.168) (0.168)  (0.168)
Observations  45878 45878 45878 45878
R-squared  0.71 0.71  0.71  0.71
Table 17. Excluding Programs without Explicit Trade Liberalization Conditions 
Note 1: Standard errors are based on country pair clustering. Separate importer, exporter, and year fixed effects are 
included but not reported.     - 39 - 
 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)
Trade condition  0.158 0.180  0.060  -0.540
(0.102) (0.102) (0.151) (0.194)
Trade condition * Implementation of trade 
conditions 
0.011 -0.005  -0.040  0.028
(0.113) (0.113) (0.106) (0.110)
Trade condition * ownership 1  0.238 
(0.146)
Trade condition * ownership 2  0.801
(0.226)
Importer WTO member, but not partner  -0.191 -0.170  -0.174  -0.202
(0.099) (0.098) (0.098) (0.098)
Importer and partner WTO 
members 
0.281 0.291  0.287  0.260
(0.067) (0.066) (0.066) (0.067)
Common border  0.788 0.689  0.690  0.689
(0.201) (0.213) (0.213) (0.213)
Ever colony  1.425 1.390  1.389  1.391
(0.219) (0.222) (0.222) (0.222)
Common 
colony 
1.063 1.049  1.049  1.047
(0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118)
Common language  0.667 0.586  0.586  0.584
(0.081) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111)
Common currency  0.117 -0.015  -0.014  -0.017
(0.249) (0.278) (0.278) (0.278)
Log distance  -1.463 -1.317  -1.317  -1.313
(0.038) (0.113) (0.113) (0.112)
Free trade area  -0.137 -0.358  -0.358  -0.360
(0.098) (0.109) (0.108) (0.109)
Log real GDP importer  0.653 0.595  0.609  0.661
(0.141) (0.141) (0.142) (0.142)
Log real GDP exporter  0.424 0.408  0.407  0.410
(0.164) (0.170) (0.170) (0.169)
Log population importer  -0.961 -0.619  -0.601  -0.405
(0.290) (0.431) (0.431) (0.431)
Log population exporter  0.009 0.605  0.607  0.600
(0.353) (0.176) (0.176) (0.175)
IMF program  -0.037 -0.041  -0.039  -0.018
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Post-IMF program  0.079 0.069  0.073  0.102
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041)
Real exchange rate 
(multilateral) 
0.006 0.006  0.006  0.006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Real exchange rate 
(bilateral) 
0.001 0.001  0.001  0.001
0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000
Mills 
ratio 
0.525  0.527  0.525
(0.103) (0.103) (0.103)
HMR ratio  0.370  0.369  0.375
(0.163) (0.163) (0.163)
Observations  49068 49068  49068  49068
R-squared  0.71 0.71  0.71  0.71
Table 18.  Nominal  Implementation of Trade Conditions 
Note 1: Standard errors are based on country pair clustering. Separate importer, exporter, and year fixed effects are 
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